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Abstract
Regional councils set objectives in 1992 to 
maintain and improve freshwater quality. Since 
then water quality in most agricultural areas has 
deteriorated. Proposals for freshwater reform need 
to understand the reasons for this long divergence 
between stated intentions and actual results. 
A key driver has been the accretion over time 
of farmer entitlements to damage freshwater 
resources. This accretion has been overseen by 
regional councils, contrary to their own stated 
objectives. Councils’ lack of precautionary action, 
and primary reliance on encouraging good 
management practices within existing livestock-
based land uses, has allowed limits to be overshot. 
Livestock numbers will now have to reduce in 
many areas. Councils are unlikely to deliver such 
an outcome without major changes to the policy 
framework.
A government which has both economic and 
environmental goals needs policy instruments 
which can decouple agricultural value creation 
from environmental impacts. This requires an 
ability to apply the polluter pays principle, to drive 
eco-efficiency, innovation and land use change. 
Six major barriers exist to implementing polluter 
pays, which should be addressed if the pastoral 
export economy is to escape being hard-wired in 
pollution-intensive mode
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Over the 30 years since regional councils were established, the desire and intention to 
maintain and improve freshwater 
quality has become increasingly salient. 
This is apparent in a series of reforms 
initiated by central government, and in 
the regional councils’ own stated policy 
objectives. It is apparent also in the 
sentiments expressed by farming leaders, 
and in several published surveys of public 
opinion. Despite this, the measured 
states of ecological health and human 
health (for recreation and mahinga kai) 
have not generally improved. Instead, 
degraded freshwater quality is an issue in 
most of New Zealand’s urban and rural 
areas, outside the conservation estate. 
While some of the most degraded water 
bodies are in urban areas, these make up 
only a small fraction of the total extent of 
degraded fresh waters. 
Most waters in streams, rivers, lakes 
and estuaries are today dominated by 
agricultural run-off (Howard-Williams et 
al., 2011). Larned et al. conclude: ‘Legacy 
effects , continued agr icultural 
intensification and urban growth, and 
projections of future intensification … all 
highlight the need for continual 
improvements in land use management, 
to limit future water-quality degradation’ 
(Larned et al., 2016, p.25). It is noteworthy 
that the present government, through its 
reform programme Essential Freshwater, 
aims to do far more than just ‘limit future 
degradation’. It boldly states: ‘At the 
election the Government won a mandate, 
and we now carry a duty, to improve the 
quality of our rivers … We’re not going 
to keep kicking the can down the road and 
leave the hard issues for future generations’ 
(Ministry for the Environment and 
Ministry for Primary Industries, 2018, 
p.4). This document further promises: ‘In 
five years there will be a noticeable 
improvement in freshwater quality’ (p.6). 
If the ministers’ reform programme is to 
succeed, it is important to understand the 
reasons for the evident difficulty in 
limiting the adverse effects of agricultural 
land use intensification over the last 30 
years. As a result, this article focuses on 
the dominant influence on rural 
freshwater quality, which today is 
agricultural land use. 
The accretion of farmer entitlements
In New Zealand, legal property rights in 
land do not include rights to erode the 
soil, to drain wetlands, to take fresh water 
for irrigation, nor to pollute water bodies. 
The fact that these things are happening, 
often on a grand scale, is because they have 
been allowed to happen by the regional 
councils, to whom, under our freshwater 
management system, very extensive 
discretions and powers of control have 
been devolved.
Councils have functions, and must 
follow processes, prescribed under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). 
In particular, they have responsibilities to 
set out their high-level strategic objectives 
and policies through regional policy 
statements, and their more detailed 
objectives, policies and rules in regional 
plans; in the case of certain activities 
allowed in the plans, they may issue 
consents, with specific conditions, to take, 
use or discharge into water. These consents 
confer legal rights in water for up to 35 
years and may then be renewed. 
Within this framework, regional 
councils may be viewed as producing two 
types of products. The first category may 
be described as statements of good intentions. 
This includes, notably, policy objectives; 
limits on the taking of water, and on 
discharges into water; and targets (limits 
which are to be met at a date in the future). 
The second category of council product 
may be described as entitlements. This 
includes: consents; rules which establish 
permitted activities; certificates of 
compliance; grandparented (see below) 
nutrient discharge allocations for water 
bodies; and, arguably, non-complying 
practices that are informally allowed to 
continue for protracted periods as a result 
of council decisions, or through a lack of 
commitment to compliance enforcement.
The key point about how the system 
works in practice is that these two types of 
products are quite commonly not aligned 
with each other. Statements of good 
intentions are important for councillors’ 
political purposes as they align with 
expressed wishes of the electorate and, in 
most regions, are necessary for councillors 
to win election. Entitlements, on the other 
hand, are of disproportionate importance 
for a small sub-section of the electorate 
comprising agricultural water users – those 
engaged in the taking of water or 
discharging contaminants into water. 
Water users seek certainty of entitlements 
as a basis for their borrowings and ongoing 
investments in their businesses. They 
oppose any reduction in entitlements 
which may affect the value of their land. 
These motivations are perhaps inevitable; 
but the regulatory system is clearly failing 
when councils take decisions to create 
entitlements which are not in alignment 
with their own policies, limits and targets.
In 1992, as required by the Resource 
Management Act, every regional council 
consulted the public in its region and 
published a regional policy statement. 
Every regional policy statement contained 
strategic objectives to maintain or improve 
freshwater quality. Since 1992, long-
established and conspicuous adverse trends 
in water quality have made it clear that 
In New Zealand, legal property rights in
land do not include rights to erode the
soil, to drain wetlands, to take fresh 
water for irrigation, nor to pollute water 
bodies. The fact that these things are 
happening ... is because they have
been allowed to happen by the regional
councils ...
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these objectives have not been delivered on 
in agricultural areas in most regions. This 
is partly because regional plans, developed 
to implement the councils’ stated objectives, 
generally placed the main emphasis on 
‘education’, that is, encouraging voluntary 
uptake of good management practice by 
farmers. This is a doctrine which, in 
intensively farmed areas, has not proved to 
be consistent with the objective of 
improving water quality (see next section). 
But of particular significance is the fact that 
many councils went further, to allow 
activities and practices to become 
established and to persist which they must 
have known were inconsistent with 
achieving their stated objectives. In doing 
so, they established accretions to the 
bundle of rights and entitlements which 
are assumed and relied upon by farmers. 
Five main routes to council-established 
accretions of farmer entitlements may be 
identified:
(1) By introducing rules which create certain 
permitted activities, and by issuing 
certificates of compliance which then 
protect those activities against future rule 
changes. In many regions experiencing 
dairy industry growth, permitted 
activity status was extended to allowing 
stock access to waterways and unlimited 
fertiliser application. Fortunately, 
Fonterra took an initiative to secure 
fencing of larger dairying streams in 
2001 and some councils followed suit 
in their plans, but intensive sheep and 
beef farming still does not require 
fencing in a number of council plans, 
and national stream fencing regulations 
announced in 2017 have never been 
gazetted. Unlimited fertiliser 
application continues to be an accreted 
farmer entitlement in most parts of 
New Zealand outside Canterbury. The 
role of certificates of compliance is to 
convert permitted activities into a legal 
entitlement attached to an individual 
property, essentially equivalent to a 
consent. The certificates have been in 
high demand in many regions because 
they protect property owners against 
any new rules which may be introduced 
by way of a proposed plan.
(2) By delaying the establishment of any 
form of limits, and in the meantime 
issuing consents which cumulatively 
overshoot the needed limits. Most 
councils established no meaningful 
limits on issuing water consents during 
the first 20 years of the RMA, although, 
according to a 2008 study by the New 
Zealand Business Council for 
Sustainable Development based on 
council staff  appraisals, most 
catchments were close to fully allocated, 
or over-allocated, by that date. 
Canterbury was the most conspicuous 
example of consents overshooting 
needed limits. A ‘gold rush’ for water 
for irrigated dairying starting from the 
early 1990s had led to unrestrained 
consent issuance for water takes; the 
council subsequently refused to agree 
to environmentalists’ requests to seek 
powers for a moratorium on further 
consenting; and dramatic drops in 
groundwater levels occurred during the 
irrigation season, with parallel effects 
on lowland stream flows. In 2006 came 
the announcement of the Programme 
for the Restoration of Lowland Streams, 
which failed, and a strategy was 
advanced for building water storages 
which could take pressure off the 
aquifers without curbing farming 
activity. However, the combination of 
these policies with unlimited fertiliser 
application as a permitted use led to a 
widespread and rapid build-up of 
groundwater nitrates in irrigated 
farming areas. This rise is ongoing 
despite the recent introduction of 
limits and targets. (Parliament 
dismissed the council in 2010 and 
commissioners were appointed, in what 
has been so far an only partially 
successful effort to bring water 
management under control.) 
(3) By protecting some or all existing land 
and water users once recognised limits 
have been overshot by the proposing of 
rules creating grandparenting 
arrangements. Grandparenting involves 
the conferring of an exclusive privilege 
to pollute water (or emit greenhouse 
gases) at or near existing levels on a 
politically powerful group. It thereby 
defers – for a decade or more, with 
likelihood of renewal – any need to take 
responsibility for the resulting 
environmental impacts. In the absence 
of statutory authority to auction, or 
progressively charge for, rights to use 
or take water, grandparenting by 
regulatory fiat has become the default 
allocation strategy adopted by regional 
councils. To provide a genuine, second-
best solution to the need to allocate 
responsibilities for meeting limits while 
providing for a transition, any 
grandparenting should include a 
binding exit strategy which clearly 
signals to land users the imperatives of 
early change, including, for many, the 
need for a change of land use. This, 
however, is far from the minds of most 
regional councils which propose 
grandparenting arrangements. For 
example, an 80-year period to achieve 
water quality targets is embodied in 
Waikato’s PC 1 proposal, which is 
accordingly very modest in the 
demands it makes of its major source 
of nutrient contamination, the dairy 
industry, targeting only the most 
egregious 25% of polluters for 
reductions in the coming decade, while 
locking in entitlements for the other 
75% to continue their present levels of 
pollution.
(4) By excessively protracted delays in taking 
compliance enforcement action against 
Since 1992, long-established and 
conspicuous adverse trends in water 
quality have made it clear that these 
objectives have not been delivered on in 
agricultural areas in most regions. 
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non-complying practices. While not 
strictly speaking an entitlement, an 
ability to rely on non-enforcement of 
consent conditions created something 
akin to it for dairy farmers in some 
regions for many years. Most councils 
have significantly improved their 
compliance monitoring and 
enforcement activity in recent years, 
but some disturbing reports still come 
to light. For example, in Waikato in 
October 2018, 20 years after dairy shed 
effluent management rules were first 
introduced and 11 years after the 
current plan provisions came into force, 
it was reported that grossly undersized 
effluent storage, likely to lead to 
pollution incidents, still existed on 19% 
of the region’s 4,500 dairy farms, that 
only 76 of 432 high-risk farms asked to 
upgrade had complied, and that at the 
current rate of progress it would take 
27 years for them to comply (Farmers 
Weekly, 2018).
(5) By introducing payments for good 
environmental practice (which effectively 
confer a right to bad practice on those 
farmers not being paid to desist). There 
is a long-established practice, predating 
the establishment of regional councils, 
of entitling the farming of highly 
erodible land while encouraging soil 
erosion plantings with grants. This 
combination has the unwanted effects 
of  displacing private forestry 
investment and slowing down the rate 
of land protection to the rate at which 
public funds are made available. Under 
this policy, retirement of highly 
erodible land from pastoral use will 
take many decades.
Attempted restraint of the accretions process
In 2014 the regional plan (‘One Plan’) of the 
Horizons Regional Council (Manawatü–
Whanganui) entered into force after 
years of debate and litigation. For the 
first time, some farmers were required 
to obtain intensive land use consents, to 
ensure that the plan’s freshwater limits 
were met. It soon became apparent that 
the council’s primary concern was to 
ensure that existing intensive farming 
businesses were not forced by these limits 
into de-intensifying or changing land use. 
Environmentalists contended that many 
consents were being issued illegally, and 
that a council resolution which appeared 
to direct officers to do this was also illegal. 
In 2017 the Environment Court upheld 
these claims, saying: 
Economic consequences for private 
individuals are an inevitable corollary 
of regulation in the public interest. 
That is not a reason to manipulate or 
pervert plan implementation … The 
potential environmental impact of the 
activities in question is very significant 
… The declarations are required to 
protect the integrity of the One Plan 
and the community’s confidence in 
Council decision-making. ([2017] 
NZEnvC37, para 182) 
The council revoked its resolution and 
stopped illegally issuing consents. But 
having already apparently committed, in 
its earlier consents, too much of the known, 
total allowable envelope of nitrogen 
discharges, the council was unable to 
consent a further 118 operating dairy 
farms and 60 commercial vegetable growers, 
who have simply continued to operate 
without consents. An independent report 
commissioned by the council estimated the 
impact on farms of the One Plan continuing 
in force, assuming an uncontroversial 
updating of a technical table in the plan. 
The report said: 
nitrogen losses would drop by over 200 
tonnes[/yr] (40%) and milk production 
by over 700 tonnes over 20 years (5%). 
However, some farms would still 
struggle to remain financially viable … 
It is possible that some of the affected 
farmers would consider amalgamating 
and others to change their existing 
landuse away from dairying. (Parminter, 
Ridsdale and Bryant, 2018, p.7)
It appeared that such a combination of 
outcomes would be politically unacceptable 
to the council, which in April 2019 
announced that it would simply change the 
plan to achieve its original intention, ‘water 
quality improvement within the means of 
most farmers’.1 Litigation over this could 
well take years to resolve. The experience 
suggests that, notwithstanding the views 
of the Environment Court, the real power 
lies with the regional council, even if it is 
only a power to delay.
Many councils have shown that 
politically driven delays in introducing or 
enforcing limits are a key to the accretion 
process, since, once land use intensification 
has been allowed to occur, even if it 
damages freshwater resources it becomes 
extremely difficult to reverse. Indeed, the 
significance of allowing accretions to 
become established becomes clearer when 
the psychology and politics of trying to 
reverse them later are brought into focus. 
Kahnemann (2011) has shown that risk 
aversion is asymmetrical: people are more 
willing to act to avert a loss than to achieve 
again. Olson (1971) has shown that in the 
pursuit of public goods, power is also 
asymmetrical: the common good of large 
latent groups is poorly incentivised 
compared to the strong incentives which 
can operate in small groups, such as those 
with vested interests at stake. It is the 
combined force of these two well-known 
tendencies of human behaviour that makes 
the ongoing accretions issue so critical in 
the operation of limits-based governance. 
Various technical devices may then be 
used which purport to create win-wins for 
both freshwater limits and farm profitability, 
and it is the promise of these devices that 
is commonly relied upon to justify non-
regulatory approaches by councils. Some 
devices are collective good projects 
involving community water storage, 
... once land use intensification 
has been allowed to occur, even if 
it damages freshwater resources it 
becomes extremely difficult to reverse.
Page 12 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 15, Issue 3 – August 2019
managed aquifer recharge or the 
management of groundwater nitrate 
attenuation, but for the most part they 
comprise good management practices 
(GMPs) which are dependent on individual 
landowner actions. The alleged promise of 
GMPs for solving freshwater problems has 
strongly underpinned councils’ 
characteristic delays in introducing and 
implementing freshwater limits. The 
problematic nature of reliance on GMPs 
for delivering results in a limits-based 
system is explored next.
The doctrine of encouraging good 
management practice
Good management practices, and 
supporting measures for their 
dissemination such as catchment 
management groups and farm 
environmental plans, are clearly good 
things in themselves. The issues for debate 
are whether relying on them is really an 
adequate response by itself; and, where it 
is not, what kind of relationship should 
exist between them and the regulatory 
framework. There is optimism in some 
quarters that simply adding a regulatory 
‘nudge’ to farmer uptake of GMPs, without 
creating impetus for reducing livestock 
numbers, would meet the government’s 
objectives. This view embodies two 
assumptions, each of which is challenged 
in this section. The assumptions are:
•	 that	if	existing	farmers	were	all	to	apply	
GMPs, environmental outcomes would 
then be satisfactory; and 
•	 that	a	regulatory	system	based	around	
GMPs, and therefore controlling how 
farming was done, could be designed 
and operated in a way that stimulated, 
rather than curbing, the innovation 
and land use changes that New Zealand 
needs. 
Both assumptions need to be carefully 
examined in a country like New Zealand, 
whose main environmental problems 
originate in large measure from intensive, 
grass-fed livestock farming, and whose 
soils and climate offer us many other land 
use options. In 2001 the dairy industry 
began an experiment which tested the first 
assumption. The industry established five 
experimental stream catchments, 
representative of intensive dairy farming 
across New Zealand, introduced a range of 
GMPs, and measured the overall effects on 
stream water quality. 
One of these catchments, Inchbonnie, 
is really only representative of the West 
Coast, where very high rainfall, very high 
flood frequency and proximity of 
indigenous forest appears to provide a 
relatively resilient environment for 
intensive dairying, although nitrogen flows 
from dairying to Lake Brunner may have 
to be managed in future (Wilcock et al., 
2013a). Water quality in the Inchbonnie 
catchment is no longer being monitored. 
The other four GMP monitoring 
catchments, which are further examined 
here, are Bog Burn in Southland, Waikakahi 
in Canterbury, Waiokura in Taranaki and 
Toenepi in Waikato. The industry 
developed a series of GMPs and obtained 
good uptake of them among farmers in 
these four catchments. The main GMPs 
involved streamside fencing and planting, 
and improved management of dairy shed 
effluent, plus upgrading of irrigation 
technology (in Waikakahi) and of winter 
feed management (Bog Burn). 
The environmental results achieved in 
these four catchments are, from the 
perspective of a government wanting 
timely improvements in water quality, 
mostly not encouraging. After 18 years of 
monitoring (including recent regional 
council results where available), the level 
of faecal contamination in the four 
catchments remains in the worst 25% of 
sites monitored in New Zealand – 
commonly unsuitable for swimming or 
gathering mahinga kai.2 While 
concentrations of total suspended solids, 
and water clarity, have improved in all four 
streams, indicators of poor ecological 
health which were measured at the outset 
of the experiment remained largely 
unchanged when trend analyses were 
performed with data up to 2013 (Wright-
Stow and Wilcock, 2017). These results 
probably reflect the influence of multiple 
stressors, including total nitrogen, the latter 
perhaps acting indirectly. Marginal 
improvements were reported on some 
measures at Toenepi, but the Land Air 
Water Aotearoa (LAWA) website records 
that in this stream, MCI (macroinvertebrate 
index, the preferred measure of ecosystem 
health) remains ‘poor’ at 68. Only at 
Waiokura is there an encouraging picture, 
mainly apparent since 2013, with MCI near 
Manaia now rated ‘good’ at 103.5. None of 
the catchments exhibit overall the 
compulsory national values of ecosystem 
and human health defined in the existing 
National Policy Statement for Freshwater 
Management, a document which is itself 
regarded as inadequate by the present 
government.
One response to this situation would 
simply be to introduce some regulatory 
compulsion on laggards to adopt GMPs, 
perhaps by requiring farms to have certified 
farm environmental plans, of the sort 
already used and promoted by industry 
groups. Wilcock et al. (2013b) say that for 
various reasons, including market forces 
influencing farm incomes and costs, and a 
slow rate of farmer adoption of some 
GMPs, monitoring programmes ‘need to 
be much longer than ten years if they are 
to detect changes in water quality caused 
by farmer actions’ (p.410). Wright-Stow 
and Wilcock (2017) offer some optimism 
The environmental results achieved in 
the [Bog Burn in Southland, Waikakahi 
in Canterbury, Waiokura in Taranaki and 
Toenepi in Waikato] catchments are, 
from the perspective of a government 
wanting timely improvements in water 
quality, mostly not encouraging. 
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that the ecological health of the GMP 
catchments might gradually improve over 
several decades. But neither paper offers 
evidence that GMPs alone, even with 
regulatory compulsion driving their uptake, 
would enable New Zealand’s more 
intensively farmed and/or fragile areas to 
meet catchment limits for ecosystem and 
human health based on the national policy 
statement. If we are serious about meeting 
limits for these values, and especially if, like 
the government, we are wanting timely 
delivery, a more precautionary approach 
seems to be called for. 
This raises the question of whether 
livestock intensity in some areas, and 
livestock numbers overall, might need to 
be reduced, through policies favouring de-
intensification and diversification of land 
use. The case for such policies is strongly 
reinforced if climate policy is integrated 
into the policy frame, although freshwater 
policymakers probably cannot rely on 
livestock farmers being required to pay the 
full social cost of their climate emissions 
for a very long time. So what happens now 
in freshwater regulation, and the form it 
takes, still matters. Arguably, we need a 
system capable of stimulating reduced 
livestock intensity and changes of land use 
in those catchments – probably many – 
where simply implementing GMPs for 
existing livestock farming systems will not 
be sufficient. A system of farm 
environmental plans focused on GMPs and 
using certifying consultants accountable to 
regional councils may be under 
consideration, but this is an unlikely 
vehicle for ensuring that intensive land 
users change or exit. Such a system 
amounts to input regulation tailored to 
incumbent land use systems (intensive 
sheep and beef, dairy or deer farming) and 
based on ‘best practicable means’, a 
commonly used strategy in resource 
management which ‘implies that while 
better emission standards may be 
achievable, industry should not necessarily 
be required to implement them if this 
would not be practicable especially with 
respect to costs’ (Calow, 2009, p.11). Such 
a system is attractive to sectoral interests 
because its effect is to protect incumbents 
against competing land uses which could 
perform better. Although widely used 
overseas, such an approach seems 
ultimately at odds with the system of 
‘environmental bottom lines’ based on 
‘hard limits’ that New Zealand has adopted, 
following the consensus of the Land and 
Water Forum. 
Explanations for regional council behaviour
It is argued above that regional councils’ 
responses to freshwater decline have 
long emphasised encouraging good 
management practice by voluntary 
means while enabling farmers to accrete 
entitlements to degrade fresh water, 
accretions that are contrary to the councils’ 
own stated objectives; and that some 
councils are reluctant to countenance any 
significant reductions in existing livestock 
farms to achieve water quality objectives. 
What explanations can be inferred for 
this pattern of behaviour? Possible 
explanations may be examined under four 
headings: enablers; drivers; contextual 
factors; and challenges attributable to the 
logic of collective action. The enablers are 
susceptible to early central government 
action, while the other factors, although 
important, will take longer to change; they 
are addressed here only briefly.
First, the enablers notably include the 
fact that the highly discretionary section 
104 of the Resource Management Act does 
not require council-issued consents to 
comply with, or even be consistent with, 
the objectives, policies and rules set out in 
plans. Rather, the requirement is merely to 
‘have regard to’ these. Also, while since 2011 
there has been the National Policy 
Statement for Freshwater Management, 
which has legal force under the RMA, it 
currently still allows councils until 2030 to 
produce their freshwater plans. Farms 
using certificates of compliance issued 
under pre-existing rules may not be 
affected by the 2011 policy until the 2040s. 
Furthermore, it has not proved easy for 
either central government or the courts to 
require councils to comply with their own 
plans. The evident unpopularity of the 
‘removal of democracy’ at Environment 
Canterbury, and of legislative proposals to 
empower ministers to write text into 
regional plans, appears to date to have 
inhibited ministers from exercising powers 
which could be perceived as ‘overriding 
local democracy’ for the sake of meeting 
national objectives for water quality. Finally, 
the cumbersome nature of the plan change 
process, commonly requiring two rounds 
of hearings, drives delay and makes it 
difficult to curb the creeping process of 
accretions.
Second, the drivers of regional council 
behaviour include, notably, the farming 
and rural industry lobby groups, which are 
well-organised and resourced, and whose 
pressure on councils has been especially 
influential in regions where anxiety exists 
about perceived risks of socio-economic 
decline. 
Third, there are contextual factors which 
may affect regional council behaviour, 
including rural-urban differences and 
tensions between regional and district 
councils which leave little room for middle 
ground. New Zealand’s prevailing political 
culture has arguably become more 
fragmented and polarised, albeit not to the 
extent seen in some countries. Polarisation 
has sometimes been mellowed by 
collaborative efforts, such as the Manawatü 
River Leaders’ Accord.3 
Fourth, there are challenges associated 
with the logic of collective action (Olson, 
1971; Lubell et al., 2006), which lead to 
power asymmetries manifested in 
electorate awareness of issues, in council 
elections and in regional decision-making. 
While public participation opportunities 
are provided for by law, including for 
submissions, hearings and court appeals, 
... some councils are reluctant to 
countenance any significant reductions 
in existing livestock farms to achieve 
water quality objectives.
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individuals or small groups who engage in 
these activities face significant personal 
costs. When compared to the corresponding 
individual benefits of their actions, which 
are spread thinly and widely, the imbalance 
incentivises most individuals to become 
inactive free-riders. The minister for the 
environment’s technical advisory group 
wrote in 2009:
A series of public awareness surveys 
conducted by Environment Canterbury 
(ECan) every two years since its 
formation shows a fairly consistent 
pattern: only about two percent of 
Canterbury residents can name their 
local, elected ECan councillor, and only 
about ten percent can name the 
chairman of the council. It is likely that 
a similar pattern holds for other 
regional councils. The lack of a strong 
political mandate appears to hamper 
many regional councils in their dealings 
with other councils and with sector 
groups. This creates a risk of sector 
capture, and contributes to an evident 
difficulty in resolving contentious 
issues. (Minister for the Environment’s 
Technical Advisory Group, 2009, p.54)
The situation described has been 
helpful for well-organised vested interests. 
According to McNeill (2008), farmers, 
despite being less than 1% of the total 
population, comprised 38% of regional 
councillors and formed a majority in five 
of the 12 regional councils. 
In conclusion, regional councils have 
enabled widespread overshooting of 
freshwater limits to occur, and they are not 
well placed themselves to reverse this 
situation in a timely manner. Of course, 
councils do not operate in isolation, but 
form part of a multi-level governance 
structure which includes important roles 
for the Environment Court and (at least 
since 2010–11) for central government, 
which we consider next.
Issues with the multi-level governance 
structure 
Central government has long struggled 
to fulfil its intended statutory roles of 
providing a framework of national policy 
and standards, and of presenting its views 
in RMA planning processes. Numerous 
national policy initiatives came to nothing 
during the first 20 years of the RMA. Only 
following the 2009 formation of the Land 
and Water Forum, a consensus-building 
body bringing together environmentalists, 
iwi, the primary sector and energy 
companies, did progress get under way, 
leading notably to the National Policy 
Statement for Freshwater Management 
in 2011, which was added to in 2014 and 
2017. Even so, a significant proportion of 
the forum’s recommendations had not 
been implemented during its nine-year 
lifetime. The weak leadership of successive 
central governments on freshwater policy 
reflects that they have long seen their first 
priority as promoting economic growth, 
mainly through primary sector exporting. 
This has also, arguably, given primary 
sector interests a longstanding dominant 
influence over environmental policies. 
This continues to make it difficult to apply 
the polluter pays principle in agriculture, 
despite support for developing economic 
instruments based on this approach from 
the Tax Working Group (2019), the Interim 
Climate Change Committee (2018) and 
the Waikato Regional Council (2017).
The prevailing political context has also 
discouraged government control of 
mechanisms for holding farmers 
accountable for their environmental 
practices, mechanisms which are effectively 
privatised. Overseer, the computer model 
developed by fertiliser interests (with a 
minor public shareholding) to enable 
farmers to better manage their nutrient 
leakage, has been adopted by many regional 
councils to hold farmers accountable for 
discharges into water bodies which have 
nitrogen limits. The model is useful for 
councils devising grandparenting schemes. 
But the way in which it has been developed, 
the inadequate scope of its calibration, and 
its lack of transparency appear to make it 
unfit for the purpose of holding farmers 
accountable at the property level; 
consideration should be given to bringing 
Overseer into public ownership 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2018). Similarly, New 
Zealand’s systems for writing and certifying 
farm environmental plans, which have 
largely been privately developed by primary 
sector industry groups, are now being 
considered for adaptation to a public 
regulatory purpose. This arguably needs 
very careful scrutiny also, if the system is 
to avoid industry capture and the 
disincentives to innovation and land use 
change that are associated with input 
regulation and ‘best practicable means’ 
policy approaches in Europe and North 
America.
While central government has been 
proactive in recent decades in addressing 
issues around the Treaty of Waitangi and 
has formally acknowledged iwi rights and 
interests in fresh water, this has generally 
not extended to negotiating settlements. 
The Labour Party’s 2017 election policy of 
bringing fresh water into public ownership 
did not survive coalition negotiations, and 
the Ardern government’s policy now 
echoes that of the Key government in 
insisting that no one owns water. The 
ongoing political refusal to address this 
issue is the main obstacle to addressing 
most of the Land and Water Forum’s 
remaining unactioned recommendations, 
The Labour Party’s 2017 election 
policy of bringing fresh water into 
public ownership did not survive 
coalition negotiations, and the Ardern 
government’s policy now echoes that  
of the Key government in insisting that 
no one owns water.
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especially those on allocation, where the 
forum consensus was for the trading and 
pricing of defined water use rights to play 
a key role. 
Some progress has been made on iwi 
interests at the level of governance, 
especially through the creation in 2010 of 
the Waikato River Authority as a co-
governance entity sitting above the Waikato 
Regional Council. The potential for this to 
happen elsewhere spurred several other 
regional councils to establish improved 
mechanisms for engaging tangata whenua 
in council governance and policymaking. 
This shift has been important as te ao 
Mäori embodies strong distinctive values 
on fresh water, and tangata whenua have 
found it difficult to win seats on regional 
councils through the prevailing first-past-
the-post voting system.
The role of the Environment Court in 
the governance system has been 
controversial for two reasons. The long-
running jurisprudence of ‘overall balanced 
judgement’ which gave rise to 
unpredictability in court judgments, 
enabled fudging of stated objectives and 
hampered accountability in the system, was 
overturned by the Supreme Court in the 
case of Environmental Defence Society v NZ 
King Salmon ([2014] NZSC 38) in favour 
of clear environmental bottom lines. 
A second source of controversy has been 
the fact that the right of de novo merits 
appeals to the court on regional plan 
proposals effectively creates two hearings 
in most cases, contributing to the very 
cumbersome nature of the planning 
process. A lack of agility in policymaking 
can be unhelpful to the environmental 
interest by delaying much-needed change 
in prevailing policies which, as described 
earlier, are facilitating the accretion of 
farmer entitlements to pollute. A possible 
solution could involve the independent 
hearings panel model used to review the 
Auckland Unitary Plan. This model was 
designed (and appointed by) central 
government to advance urban 
intensification relatively quickly and 
effectively after decades of political impasse 
(Salmon, 2015).
Five barriers to implementing the polluter 
pays principle 
New Zealand operates a market economy 
and competes in a globalised environment, 
while the government has both economic 
and environmental objectives. It must 
therefore seek policy instruments which 
can decouple economic growth from 
environmental impacts, and, in this, the 
polluter pays principle will inevitably play 
a crucial role. The central challenge is the 
evident difficulty in implementing this 
principle within the politically powerful 
primary sector. In institutional terms, 
the main barriers may be summarised as 
follows:
•	 The	accreted	entitlement	to	farm	highly	
erodible land has institutionalised 
ongoing erosion and sedimentation, 
except to the extent that public funding 
is available to pay polluters to desist.
•	 The	failure	to	bring	fresh	water	into	
public ownership by settling iwi rights 
and interests, and the political doctrine 
that ‘nobody owns water’, has effectively 
precluded charging for its use or 
contamination.
•	 The	 longstanding	 exemption	 of	
agricultural greenhouse gases from 
pricing mechanisms has favoured the 
intensification of ruminant livestock 
farming over less-polluting varieties of 
farming and forestry.
•	 The	 reliance	 of	 policymakers	 on	
grandparenting arrangements in both 
freshwater and climate policy, without 
a binding exit timetable, perpetuates 
the accreted entitlements of established 
polluters.
•	 To	the	extent	that	polluter	pays	depends	
on timely and effective regulation, the 
present multi-level governance design 
involving central and regional 
government and the Environment 
Court, in conjunction with privatised 
mechanisms for farmer accountability, 
has proven to be too dysfunctional, 
cumbersome and lacking in precaution 
to be fit for purpose.
An integrated view needs to be taken of 
the primary sector’s environmental 
externalities, bringing the three key issues 
of biodiversity, fresh water and climate into 
a common framework. Once we do that, 
we can see that the unaccounted 
environmental costs are huge, and that by 
largely exempting agriculture from paying 
for these we have been hardwiring the 
economy into a pollution-intensive pattern 
of economic development. The real 
challenge for the government’s reforms is 
not so much to achieve some short-term 
freshwater improvements in selected 
catchments, as to make progress on the 
longer-term agenda of creating institutions 
of integrity and effectiveness, which are 
capable of decoupling economic 
development from ongoing environmental 
degradation.
1 www.horizons.govt.nz/publications-feedback/one-plan-
reviews-changes/plan-change-2. New information about 
attenuation of nitrogen flows between the root zone and 
the rivers is cited by the council in support of its proposed 
changes but has yet to be tested at a hearing.
2 In the case of Waiokura Stream, the Taranaki Regional 
Council argues that it is too small for swimming and is not 
representative of other intensively farmed catchments on the 
Mt Taranaki ring-plain because it is not directly flushed with 
flows off the mountain.
3 See www.manawaturiver.co.nz.
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